Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources

We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we find that any allocation mechanism obtained by max...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of economic theory 2015-09, Vol.159, p.137-162
Hauptverfasser: Erlanson, Albin, Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof, unanimous, consistent, and resource-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Young, 1987), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016