Federative coordination and the 'joint decision trap': the intergovernmental articulation commissions for social policy in Brazil

Collegiate bodies, formed by representatives of municipal, state and federal government were organized in order to discuss government action in selected domains of Brazilian public policy after 1988. However, a portion of the political science literature warns against the risks of decision-making paralysis or suboptimal results that may arise from joint decision arrangements that encompass several distinct levels of government. This article investigates whether the intergovernmental commissions for social policies (health, social assistance and education), considering that they operate according to rules of consensual decision and partisan representation of subnational units. In light of the empirical evidence built upon a database covering the activities of three commissions, it was possible to verify that these bodies were nevertheless capable of taking a high number of relevant decisions, except for in the case of educational policy, constrained as it is by the commission's particular institutional design, which is, in turn, the result of its unique historical trajectory compared to health and social assistance. Adapted from the source document.