Choosing the Best House in a Bad Neighborhood: Location Strategies of Human Rights INGOs in the Non-Western World

What determines the location of those human rights international non-governmental organization (INGO) resources found outside of the highly developed Western democracies? We draw a distinction between the bottom-up mobilization processes driving the location of human rights organization (HRO) member...

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Veröffentlicht in:International studies quarterly 2015-03, Vol.59 (1), p.86-98
Hauptverfasser: Barry, Colin M., Bell, Sam R., Clay, K. Chad, Flynn, Michael E., Murdie, Amanda
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:What determines the location of those human rights international non-governmental organization (INGO) resources found outside of the highly developed Western democracies? We draw a distinction between the bottom-up mobilization processes driving the location of human rights organization (HRO) members from the top-down strategic concerns driving where HRO leaders place permanent offices. In particular, we find that, while political opportunity structures generally increase the likelihood that a state has HRO members, it has a curvilinear influence on the number of HRO secretariats, which typically locate in areas seen as having a higher need for organizational resources. Further, while there is no clear connection between human rights abuses and HRO memberships in a state, HROs' strategic concerns lead them to place offices with reference to both local and neighborhood "need"—in other words, levels of repression.
ISSN:0020-8833
1468-2478
DOI:10.1111/isqu.12172