Anonymous and neutral majority rules

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral maj...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Social choice and welfare 2014-08, Vol.43 (2), p.377-401
Hauptverfasser:	Bubboloni, Daniela, Gori, Michele
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Aggregation Algebra Ambivalence Committees Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Group theory International Political Economy Linear models Majority Rule Mathematical functions Neutral countries Neutralism Neutrality Original Paper Preferences Principles Public choice Public Finance Social and Behav. Sciences Social choice Social order Social Policy Studies Sufficient conditions Symmetry Welfare
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting these rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.
ISSN:	0176-1714 1432-217X
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-013-0787-2