Generalized Condorcet winners

Generalized Condorcet winners

In an election, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who would win every twocandidate subelection against any of the other candidates. In this paper, we extend the idea of a Condorcet winner to subelections consisting of three or more candidates. We then examine some of the relationships between the re...

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Veröffentlicht in:Social choice and welfare 2014-06, Vol.43 (1), p.11-27
Hauptverfasser: Meyers, Aaron, Orrison, Michael E., Townsend, Jennifer, Wolff, Sarah, Wu, Angela
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Candidates
College mathematics
Decision Making
Economic Models
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Elections
Electoral behaviour
Electoral results
Equivalence relation
Game Theory
International Political Economy
Mathematics
Original Paper
Paradoxes
Plurality voting
Political candidates
Political Institutions
Public choice
Public Finance
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
Social welfare
Statistical analysis
Term weighting
Voters
Voting
Voting paradox
Words
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In an election, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who would win every twocandidate subelection against any of the other candidates. In this paper, we extend the idea of a Condorcet winner to subelections consisting of three or more candidates. We then examine some of the relationships between the resulting generalized Condorect winners.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-013-0765-8