How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense

Beijing's expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as "the first island chain", encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan -- all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the...

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Veröffentlicht in:Foreign affairs (New York, N.Y.) N.Y.), 2015-03, Vol.94 (2), p.78-86
1. Verfasser: Krepinevich, Andrew F.
Format: Magazinearticle
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Beijing's expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as "the first island chain", encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan -- all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in the form of airstrikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism, Washington's goal, and that of its allies and partners, should be to achieve deterrence through denial -- to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force. Leveraging the latent potential of US, allied, and partner ground forces, Washington can best achieve this objective by establishing a series of linked defenses along the first island chain -- an "Archipelagic Defense" -- and, in so doing, deny Beijing the ability to achieve its revisionist aims through aggression or coercion.
ISSN:0015-7120
2327-7793