Real Estate Agents, House Prices, and Liquidity

Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The journal of real estate finance and economics 2015-01, Vol.50 (1), p.1-33
Hauptverfasser:	Munneke, Henry J., Ooi, Joseph T. L., Sirmans, C. F., Turnbull, Geoffrey K.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Condominiums Economic models Economic statistics Economic theory Economics Economics and Finance Expected utility Financial Services Housing prices Incentives Inventory Liquidity Moral hazard Ownership Productivity Property values Real estate Real estate market Real estate sales Regional/Spatial Science Sales management Studies
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral hazard. The empirical study of how the seller-agent relationship affects both price and liquidity in a simultaneous system concludes that external agents enjoy superior selling ability that offset moral hazard effects.
ISSN:	0895-5638 1573-045X
DOI:	10.1007/s11146-013-9452-x