Revealed (P) Reference Theory

Revealed (P) Reference Theory

This paper develops axiomatically a revealed preference theory of reference-dependent choice behavior. Instead of taking the reference for an agent as exogenously given in the description of a choice problem, we suitably relax the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference to obtain, endogenously, the existe...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The American economic review 2015-01, Vol.105 (1), p.299-321
Hauptverfasser: Ok, Efe A., Ortoleva, Pietro, Riella, Gil
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Alternation
Axiomatization
Binary relations
Correspondence theory
Decision making
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Effects
Group attraction
Mathematical functions
Observed choices
Political candidates
Preferences
Rational choice theory
Rationality
Studies
Uniqueness
Utility functions
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This paper develops axiomatically a revealed preference theory of reference-dependent choice behavior. Instead of taking the reference for an agent as exogenously given in the description of a choice problem, we suitably relax the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference to obtain, endogenously, the existence of reference alternatives as well as the structure of choice behavior conditional on those alternatives. We show how this model captures some well-known choice patterns such as the attraction effect.
ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.20111046