Unintended consequences of enforcement in illicit markets

Legal enforcement of bans on goods can reduce the size of the black market but lead to greater violence by increasing revenue in the illicit market. However, the link between enforcement and violence is not as simple as is suggested by the textbook model, even for a competitive market. Nevertheless,...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2014-11, Vol.125 (2), p.295-297
Hauptverfasser: Prieger, James E., Kulick, Jonathan
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Legal enforcement of bans on goods can reduce the size of the black market but lead to greater violence by increasing revenue in the illicit market. However, the link between enforcement and violence is not as simple as is suggested by the textbook model, even for a competitive market. Nevertheless, under plausible assumptions more enforcement on trafficking in the illicit good leads to more violence. •Enforcement in black markets can lead to violence by increasing revenue.•The link between enforcement and violence is not as simple as often suggested.•Demand-side enforcement causes a demand-shifting effect in the other direction.•Menthol cigarettes face potential prohibition in the United States.•Stricter enforcement of the prohibition would likely lead to more violence.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.025