Goal setting and energy conservation
•We study the demand for an energy conservation program with non-binding goal-setting.•We develop a theoretical model to explain adoption and post-adoption consumption.•We assume consumers have present-biased and reference-dependent preferences.•Average savings is 4%, but only those with realistic g...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic behavior & organization 2014-11, Vol.107, p.209-227 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | •We study the demand for an energy conservation program with non-binding goal-setting.•We develop a theoretical model to explain adoption and post-adoption consumption.•We assume consumers have present-biased and reference-dependent preferences.•Average savings is 4%, but only those with realistic goals persistently save 11%.•Findings support our model and are difficult to explain with standard preferences.
This paper develops a theoretical model of consumer demand for an energy conservation program that involves non-binding, self-set goals. We present evidence from a Northern Illinois goal-setting program, aimed at reducing residential electricity consumption, which is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and is broadly consistent with a model of present-biased consumers with reference-dependent preferences. We find that the need for commitment is correlated with program adoption, higher pre-adoption consumption, and lower responsiveness to goals. Consumers choosing realistic goals persistently save substantially more, achieving savings of nearly 11%, than those choosing very low or unrealistically high goals. |
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ISSN: | 0167-2681 1879-1751 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.04.012 |