The EU as a frontrunner on greenhouse gas emissions trading: how did it happen and will the EU succeed?
The objective of this paper is first to provide empirical evidence of what can be seen as a rather remarkable change in EU’s position on the use of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading (ET) in climate policy, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards more of a frontrunner. The pape...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Climate Policy 2003, Vol.3 (1), p.3-18 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The objective of this paper is first to provide empirical evidence of what can be seen as a rather remarkable change in EU’s position on the use of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading (ET) in climate policy, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards more of a frontrunner. The paper argues that there is a synergistic and multilevel mix of explanatory factors for this “U-turn”, including developments at the international, EU, Member State, sub-national, and even down to the personal level. Second, the paper explores and discusses the philosophy behind the Commission’s proposal for a directive on GHG ET. Third, the paper examines the prospects for ‘success’ of a scheme for EU-wide ET using a multifaceted set of metrics. In brief, we argue that
output success—the chances for having a directive adopted—hinges on the resolution of two key issues. First, whether the preliminary phase is to be mandatory or voluntary, and second, incompatibilities with domestic ET schemes.
Outcome success—steering and cost-effectiveness—will in turn depend on factors like the coverage of the scheme and inclusion of project-based credits, while more long-term
political implications hinges on the successful adoption and operation of the scheme.
Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström. |
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ISSN: | 1469-3062 |
DOI: | 10.1016/S1469-3062(02)00096-7 |