Competition, defense and games between plants

Coexistence of defended and undefended plants may be maintained by herbivory. In the present paper this phenomenon is analyzed by means of evolutionary game theory. The plants in the model play either a defensive or a non-defensive strategy and they interact indirectly: when a plant is grazed its competitive ability decreases, because of this a neighboring plant makes a profit. The solution to the game leads to three qualitatively different cases depending on whether the profit is equal for the two strategies, defended and undefended, or if the profit is higher for one type than for the other. When the results are applied to intra-specific interactions, the model predicts that polymorphic populations should be expected only under certain specific conditions. When the results are applied to inter-specific interactions, the model predicts either stable coexistence, i.e., increased diversity, or a paradoxical situation without increased diversity.