The spending power after NFIB v. Sebelius

Prior to the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in New York v. United States, which kicked off the so-called federalist revival, there was not much reason to care about the spending power. The task for a modern spending power doctrine, however, is not as simple as, for example, prohibiting any condi...

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Veröffentlicht in:Harvard journal of law and public policy 2014-01, Vol.37 (1), p.71-81
1. Verfasser: Baker, Lynn A
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Prior to the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in New York v. United States, which kicked off the so-called federalist revival, there was not much reason to care about the spending power. The task for a modern spending power doctrine, however, is not as simple as, for example, prohibiting any conditional offer of federal funds to the States that, if accepted, might regulate the States in a way that Congress could not directly mandate. Simply put, the problem for modern spending power doctrine is this how the courts can distinguish and invalidate those conditional offers of federal funds to the States that threaten to render meaningless the Tenth Amendment and its notion of a federal government of limited powers, while at the same time affording Congress a power to spend for the general welfare that is greater than its power to directly regulate the States.
ISSN:0193-4872
2374-6572