Theory and Evaluation: Research on the Salary of NBA Players
Using methods of literature consultation and mathematical statistics, this paper focus on the salary of NBA players based on a perspective of theory and empirical evidence. The results suggest league and labor union have certain power in the bilateral monopoly of labor market of professional sports,...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Beijing ti yu da xue xue bao 2013-11, Vol.36 (11), p.38-43 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | chi |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Using methods of literature consultation and mathematical statistics, this paper focus on the salary of NBA players based on a perspective of theory and empirical evidence. The results suggest league and labor union have certain power in the bilateral monopoly of labor market of professional sports, and employment and salary fluctuate in a certain range according to the bargaining ability of two sides. The salaries of players are determined by demand and supply in the labor market under the framework of the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement. NBA players gain an average of 18.4% of Marginal Revenue Product. Bidding war among teams brings star players higher payment rate, whereas players with lower salary gain lower proportion of payment. Regulations of Collective Bargaining Agreement for the minimum employment and expenses for special training make substituted players gain the salary that offset or even exceed the value they create, gaining higher payment rate. Rookie players pay for general training by the |
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ISSN: | 1007-3612 |