Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation

This paper studies the resource allocation problem based on agents’ opinions with possible delegation. In other words, any agent can report just some components of the allocation vector as his request. We describe symmetrical anonymous generalized median voter schemes supplemented with delegation pr...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Automation and remote control 2013-09, Vol.74 (9), p.1557-1566
Hauptverfasser:	Bondarik, V. N., Korgin, N. A.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Allocations CAE) and Design Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control Optimization Computer-Aided Engineering (CAD Control Control Sciences Mathematics Mathematics and Statistics Mechanical Engineering Mechatronics Robotics Systems Theory
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creator	Bondarik, V. N. Korgin, N. A.
description	This paper studies the resource allocation problem based on agents’ opinions with possible delegation. In other words, any agent can report just some components of the allocation vector as his request. We describe symmetrical anonymous generalized median voter schemes supplemented with delegation procedures; they can be applied for solving the posed problem.
doi_str_mv	10.1134/S0005117913090117
format	Article
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subjects	Allocations CAE) and Design Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control Optimization Computer-Aided Engineering (CAD Control Control Sciences Mathematics Mathematics and Statistics Mechanical Engineering Mechatronics Robotics Systems Theory
title	Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation
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