Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation

Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation

This paper studies the resource allocation problem based on agents’ opinions with possible delegation. In other words, any agent can report just some components of the allocation vector as his request. We describe symmetrical anonymous generalized median voter schemes supplemented with delegation pr...

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Veröffentlicht in:Automation and remote control 2013-09, Vol.74 (9), p.1557-1566
Hauptverfasser: Bondarik, V. N., Korgin, N. A.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Allocations
CAE) and Design
Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control
Optimization
Computer-Aided Engineering (CAD
Control
Control Sciences
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Mechanical Engineering
Mechatronics
Robotics
Systems Theory
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This paper studies the resource allocation problem based on agents’ opinions with possible delegation. In other words, any agent can report just some components of the allocation vector as his request. We describe symmetrical anonymous generalized median voter schemes supplemented with delegation procedures; they can be applied for solving the posed problem.
ISSN:0005-1179
1608-3032
DOI:10.1134/S0005117913090117