Social risk model of economic governance
The analysis of the consequences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on the economic and monetary union (euro crisis, sovereign debt crisis, banking crisis, economic recession, etc.) often starts from an economic or political point of view. The resulting debates are for example on the relevance of aus...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique 2013-01, Vol.52 (2-3), p.113-125 |
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Zusammenfassung: | The analysis of the consequences of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on the economic and monetary union (euro crisis, sovereign debt crisis, banking crisis, economic recession, etc.) often starts from an economic or political point of view. The resulting debates are for example on the relevance of austerity policies, on how to boost growth, etc. One particular point of view is often overlooked: the institutional perspective. In this paper, the author takes as his starting point the question as to whether the institutional balance of economic and monetary union is optimal (or not) in the context of the crisis. This (im)balance includes especially the question of the sharing of responsibilities within the EU institutions and between these institutions and the Member States. What is - or should be, according to the treaties - the responsibility of the Member States, the European Commission and the European Central Bank to promote growth and employment? The author concludes that this division is currently sub-optimal, which results in a considerable reduction in the scope of policies. Ultimately, this leads the European institutions and the Member States to restrict their means of action to structural reforms. This has resulted in a collapse of the social dimension of the European project, as it is transformed into a variable of adjustment to economic shocks. This follows from (a lack of) political choices behind institutional imbalances, and could be corrected by giving Europe real social governance and adjustment instruments. //ABSTRACT IN FRENCH: L'analyse des conséquences de la crise financière de 2007-2008 sur l'union économique et monétaire (crise de l'euro, des dettes souveraines, du secteur bancaire, récession économique, etc.) prend souvent l'angle de vue économique ou politique. Les débats qui en résultent portent par exemple sur la pertinence des politiques d'austérité, sur la manière de relancer la croissance, etc. Un angle de vue est souvent négligé : l'angle institutionnel. Dans cette contribution, l'auteur prend comme point de départ la question de savoir si l'équilibre institutionnel de l'union économique et monétaire est ou non optimal dans un contexte de crise. Ce (dés)équilibre inclut principalement la question du partage des responsabilités au sein des institutions européennes, et entre celles-ci et les États membres. Ainsi, quelle est - ou devrait être, selon les traités - la part de responsabilité des États membres, de la Commission europée |
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ISSN: | 0034-2971 |
DOI: | 10.3917/rpve.522.0113 |