The hot-hand fallacy in cognitive control: Repetition expectancy modulates the congruency sequence effect

In this study, the role of expectancies in cognitive control was tested. On the basis of the original interpretation of the congruency sequence effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 121:480–506, 1992 ), we sought evidence for a repetition bias steering at...

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Veröffentlicht in:Psychonomic bulletin & review 2013-08, Vol.20 (4), p.798-805
Hauptverfasser: Duthoo, Wout, Wühr, Peter, Notebaert, Wim
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:In this study, the role of expectancies in cognitive control was tested. On the basis of the original interpretation of the congruency sequence effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 121:480–506, 1992 ), we sought evidence for a repetition bias steering attentional control. In a series of four Stroop experiments, we investigated how participants’ explicit predictions about the upcoming (in)congruency proactively influenced subsequent Stroop performance. Similar to the fallacious “hot-hand” belief in gambling, repeating stimulus events were overpredicted, as participants consistently expected more repetitions of the congruency level than the actual presented number of congruency-level repetitions (50 %). Moreover, behavioral adjustments (i.e., a congruency sequence effect) were only found when participants anticipated a congruency-level repetition, whereas no modulation of the Stroop effect was found following alternation predictions. We propose that proactive control processes in general, and repetition expectancy in particular, should be given more attention in current theorizing and modeling of cognitive control, which is characterized by an emphasis on reactive, conflict-induced control adjustments.
ISSN:1069-9384
1531-5320
DOI:10.3758/s13423-013-0390-7