Escalating penalties: a supergame approach

Escalating penalties: a supergame approach

The paper provides an economic rationale for punishing repeat offenders with increasing sanctions. We analyze the optimal intertemporal punishment scheme within a supergame framework, in which the legal authority is assumed to minimize the social costs of punishment under the constraint of keeping d...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics of governance 2012-03, Vol.13 (1), p.29-49
Hauptverfasser: Endres, Alfred, Rundshagen, Bianca
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Costs
Crime prevention
Criminal law
Criminality
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Environmental policy
Game theory
Habitual offenders
International Political Economy
Negligence
Offenders
Optimization
Original Paper
Political Theory
Public Administration
Public Finance
Punishment
Sanctions
Social costs
Studies
Violations
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The paper provides an economic rationale for punishing repeat offenders with increasing sanctions. We analyze the optimal intertemporal punishment scheme within a supergame framework, in which the legal authority is assumed to minimize the social costs of punishment under the constraint of keeping delinquency at an exogenously given maximal tolerable level.
ISSN:1435-6104
1435-8131
DOI:10.1007/s10101-011-0101-7