Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result.

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of mathematical economics 2013-01, Vol.49 (1), p.106-110
Hauptverfasser: Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, Page, Frank H., Svaiter, Benar fux
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Auction theory
Auctions
Bidders
Economic models
Exclusion
Mathematical economics
Multidimensional analysis
Multidimensional types
Optimal auctions
Social exclusion
Studies
Types exclusion
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of a positive measure of bidder types occur. The results complements Armstrong’s (1996) exclusion of types result.
ISSN:0304-4068
1873-1538
DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.11.001