Remedies For Monopolization From Standard Oil To Microsoft And Intel: The Changing Nature Of Monopoly Law From Elimination Of Market Power To Regulation Of Its Use

Academic commentators have, over the years, lamented the failure of monopoly remedies to achieve effective relief. For some, the failure highlighted the foolishness of the law interfering with market structures and conduct, while for others it was evidence of the failure of the courts and law enforcers to act with sufficient boldness and courage. Both lines of critics focus on the options chosen and by implication assume that a better option would have existed if only those enforcing the law had adopted it. It is the thesis of this Article that this change in the meaning of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) came about in response to the changing character of the cases that came before the courts. That change caused the courts to abandon the older view of monopoly law and substitute doctrines that are the equivalent of the European concept of abuse of a dominant position. To be sure, the American version neither admits its continental heritage nor employs the stricter standards of the European Union. Adapted from the source document.