The communication burden of payment determination

In the presence of self-interested parties, mechanism designers typically aim to implement some social-choice function in an equilibrium. This paper studies the cost of such equilibrium requirements in terms of communication. While a certain amount of information x needs to be communicated just for...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2013-01, Vol.77 (1), p.153-167
Hauptverfasser:	Babaioff, Moshe, Blumrosen, Liad, Schapira, Michael
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Communication Communication complexity Decision making models Economic models Equilibrium Implementation Mathematical functions Mechanism design Payment systems Payments Public choice Revelation principle Self-interest Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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