On the pragmatic and principled limits and possibilities of dialogue
One of the key themes to emerge from this forum is the dangers of an overly stark contrast between empirical and normative scholarship, a distinction that is presupposed of course in raising the question of their relationship. While Moral Limit invoked that and other related distinctions as analytic...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | International theory 2012-11, Vol.4 (3), p.477-492 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | One of the key themes to emerge from this forum is the dangers of an overly stark contrast between empirical and normative scholarship, a distinction that is presupposed of course in raising the question of their relationship. While Moral Limit invoked that and other related distinctions as analytical devices rather than incompatible ontological and epistemological positions, I concur that such a dichotomy (along with other contrasts) can easily become problematic, not the least if (1) it is taken to imply an epistemological distinction that 'empirical' research does not always involve interpretivism; and/or (2) it entails insufficient recognition of the ways that various kinds of normative theory engage a range of what ought to be recognized under a broad banner of 'empirical' considerations as Erskine truly most usefully underscores in her response. The caution that so many forms of what we may understand as international political theory (IPT) are better seen as lying on something of a continuum of different forms and degrees of self-conscious engagement with the empirical 'real world' is thus an appreciated corrective to be well heeded, particularly the way various 'interpretive' approaches offer windows into such concerns. Yet, Erskine's invocation of 'interpretive' strategies as a critical resource in normative approaches is left underdeveloped. This is a tall order beyond this limited forum, about which of course so much has been written elsewhere, yet it just is not clear what is analytically special about 'interpreting' moral norms and criteria along the lines she suggests for the rather focused present purposes of navigating the question of moral limits and possibilities. In any case, I hope that such qualifiers are kept in mind when such terms are deployed for the analytical uses that they can serve; later I point to other limitations presented by various dichotomies invoked in the course of this dialogue. Adapted from the source document. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1752-9719 1752-9727 |
DOI: | 10.1017/S1752971912000176 |