A Deception Mechanism against Compromised Station Attacks in I II 802.11 Channel-Hopping Systems
We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in I II 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | IEICE transactions on communications 2012-01, Vol.E95.B (10) |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | jpn |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 10 |
| container_start_page | |
| container_title | IEICE transactions on communications |
| container_volume | E95.B |
| creator | JEUNG, Jaemin JEONG, Seungmyeong LIM, JaeSung |
| description | We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in I II 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access point notifies a new hopping seed but not to the jammer, while a deception station deceives the jammer. Simulations show that the proposed scheme increases network throughput compared to conventional channel hopping schemes when they are under compromised station attacks. |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1221864963</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>1221864963</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-proquest_miscellaneous_12218649633</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqVjLsOgjAUQBujiUT5hzu6YCiPAiNBDQxOumvFKzZCi94y-PcS4w84neWcM2EOT6LY42EUT5njZ1x4aczFnLlE6uKHIgoyP4kdds5hgzX2VhkNe6zvUivqQDZSabJQmK5_mU4RXuFg5dfKrZX1g0BpqKCqIPWDNedQjKnG1itN3yvdwOFNFjtastlNtoTujwu22m2PRemN3-eAZE_jvca2lRrNQCceBDwVUSbC8A_1A6EWSP8</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1221864963</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A Deception Mechanism against Compromised Station Attacks in I II 802.11 Channel-Hopping Systems</title><source>Alma/SFX Local Collection</source><creator>JEUNG, Jaemin ; JEONG, Seungmyeong ; LIM, JaeSung</creator><creatorcontrib>JEUNG, Jaemin ; JEONG, Seungmyeong ; LIM, JaeSung</creatorcontrib><description>We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in I II 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access point notifies a new hopping seed but not to the jammer, while a deception station deceives the jammer. Simulations show that the proposed scheme increases network throughput compared to conventional channel hopping schemes when they are under compromised station attacks.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0916-8516</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1745-1345</identifier><language>jpn</language><subject>Channels ; Deception ; Jammers ; Networks ; Recognition ; Seeds ; Simulation ; Stations</subject><ispartof>IEICE transactions on communications, 2012-01, Vol.E95.B (10)</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>JEUNG, Jaemin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>JEONG, Seungmyeong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>LIM, JaeSung</creatorcontrib><title>A Deception Mechanism against Compromised Station Attacks in I II 802.11 Channel-Hopping Systems</title><title>IEICE transactions on communications</title><description>We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in I II 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access point notifies a new hopping seed but not to the jammer, while a deception station deceives the jammer. Simulations show that the proposed scheme increases network throughput compared to conventional channel hopping schemes when they are under compromised station attacks.</description><subject>Channels</subject><subject>Deception</subject><subject>Jammers</subject><subject>Networks</subject><subject>Recognition</subject><subject>Seeds</subject><subject>Simulation</subject><subject>Stations</subject><issn>0916-8516</issn><issn>1745-1345</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqVjLsOgjAUQBujiUT5hzu6YCiPAiNBDQxOumvFKzZCi94y-PcS4w84neWcM2EOT6LY42EUT5njZ1x4aczFnLlE6uKHIgoyP4kdds5hgzX2VhkNe6zvUivqQDZSabJQmK5_mU4RXuFg5dfKrZX1g0BpqKCqIPWDNedQjKnG1itN3yvdwOFNFjtastlNtoTujwu22m2PRemN3-eAZE_jvca2lRrNQCceBDwVUSbC8A_1A6EWSP8</recordid><startdate>20120101</startdate><enddate>20120101</enddate><creator>JEUNG, Jaemin</creator><creator>JEONG, Seungmyeong</creator><creator>LIM, JaeSung</creator><scope>7SP</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>L7M</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20120101</creationdate><title>A Deception Mechanism against Compromised Station Attacks in I II 802.11 Channel-Hopping Systems</title><author>JEUNG, Jaemin ; JEONG, Seungmyeong ; LIM, JaeSung</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-proquest_miscellaneous_12218649633</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>jpn</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Channels</topic><topic>Deception</topic><topic>Jammers</topic><topic>Networks</topic><topic>Recognition</topic><topic>Seeds</topic><topic>Simulation</topic><topic>Stations</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>JEUNG, Jaemin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>JEONG, Seungmyeong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>LIM, JaeSung</creatorcontrib><collection>Electronics & Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><jtitle>IEICE transactions on communications</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>JEUNG, Jaemin</au><au>JEONG, Seungmyeong</au><au>LIM, JaeSung</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Deception Mechanism against Compromised Station Attacks in I II 802.11 Channel-Hopping Systems</atitle><jtitle>IEICE transactions on communications</jtitle><date>2012-01-01</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>E95.B</volume><issue>10</issue><issn>0916-8516</issn><eissn>1745-1345</eissn><abstract>We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in I II 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access point notifies a new hopping seed but not to the jammer, while a deception station deceives the jammer. Simulations show that the proposed scheme increases network throughput compared to conventional channel hopping schemes when they are under compromised station attacks.</abstract></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0916-8516 |
| ispartof | IEICE transactions on communications, 2012-01, Vol.E95.B (10) |
| issn | 0916-8516 1745-1345 |
| language | jpn |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1221864963 |
| source | Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Channels Deception Jammers Networks Recognition Seeds Simulation Stations |
| title | A Deception Mechanism against Compromised Station Attacks in I II 802.11 Channel-Hopping Systems |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-11T01%3A34%3A26IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20Deception%20Mechanism%20against%20Compromised%20Station%20Attacks%20in%20I%20II%20802.11%20Channel-Hopping%20Systems&rft.jtitle=IEICE%20transactions%20on%20communications&rft.au=JEUNG,%20Jaemin&rft.date=2012-01-01&rft.volume=E95.B&rft.issue=10&rft.issn=0916-8516&rft.eissn=1745-1345&rft_id=info:doi/&rft_dat=%3Cproquest%3E1221864963%3C/proquest%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1221864963&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |