A Deception Mechanism against Compromised Station Attacks in I II 802.11 Channel-Hopping Systems
We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in I II 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access...
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Veröffentlicht in: | IEICE transactions on communications 2012-01, Vol.E95.B (10) |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | jpn |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | We propose a deception mechanism to combat a compromised station in I II 802.11 channel hopping systems. A compromised station can follow the hopping channels and continuously attack them, since it recognizes the channel-hopping sequence. The key concept of the deception mechanism is that an access point notifies a new hopping seed but not to the jammer, while a deception station deceives the jammer. Simulations show that the proposed scheme increases network throughput compared to conventional channel hopping schemes when they are under compromised station attacks. |
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ISSN: | 0916-8516 1745-1345 |