Risk-taking for others under accountability

We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations. ► We test the...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2012, Vol.114 (1), p.102-105
Hauptverfasser: Pahlke, Julius, Strasser, Sebastian, Vieider, Ferdinand M.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations. ► We test the effects of a justification requirement on decisions under responsibility. ► Loss aversion is found to decrease with the justification requirement. ► Choices in the pure gain and pure loss domains are unaffected. ► This points to a de-biasing mechanism for (myopic) loss aversion.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.037