The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence

We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets for corpora...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Review of financial studies 2012-06, Vol.25 (6), p.1675-1712
Hauptverfasser: Franks, Julian, Mayer, Colin, Volpin, Paolo, Wagner, Hannes F.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries that have low investment opportunities and low merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, the same is not so in countries that have low investor protection, where the presence of family control in an industry is unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A activity. (JEL G32, G34)
ISSN:0893-9454
1465-7368
DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhr135