A CRITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF PAUL TILLICH'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Opinions differ on the importance of epistemology for Tillich. While Dorothy Emmet suggests that epistemology is in the centre of Tillich's thinking, Henel believes that Tillich did not take any serious interest in epistemology proper. Since Tillich tries to downplay the relevance of epistemological concerns, it would seem that Henel's judgement is closer to the truth. Yet, as a consequence of his German philosophical education, Tillich employs a rather specific notion of ‘epistemology’ which relies heavily on (Marburg Neo-) Kantian usage. But if we utilize a notion of ‘epistemology’ that is not informed by this rather specific philosophical background, as I intend to do, we will come to classify several tenets of the Tillichian approach to be epistemological ones that he himself might not have labelled thus. Given such a notion of ‘epistemology’, epistemological concerns cannot be denied to play an important role in Tillich's approach. I will proceed in three steps, each representing one section of the paper. First, I will begin with what I call Tillich's attempt to ground the transcendent on the transcendental in his German period. Second, I will demonstrate in which way Tillich's epistemology undergoes changes after his emigration to the U.S., utilizing his ‘critical phenomenology’ as a paradigmatic case. Third, I will provide a critical evaluation of Tillich's epistemology and suggest ways of reconstructing it.