ARE EMOTIONS PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES OF VALUE?

A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by ‘perceptual modality’ I mea...

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Veröffentlicht in:Ratio (Oxford) 2012-03, Vol.25 (1), p.93-107
1. Verfasser: Whiting, Demian
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by ‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with ‘emotional perception’. But I also say why the usual candidate offered – namely feeling or affectivity – does not give us the sought‐after perceptual modality. I conclude that as there seems to be nothing else that can provide the needed perceptual modality, we should reject the perceptual theory of emotion.1
ISSN:0034-0006
1467-9329
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x