Cost-Raising Strategies
This paper studies a variety of strategies by which firms could disadvantage rivals by raising their costs. In this paper, we show that strategies designed to raise rivals' costs have a number of advantages over predatory pricing: They are credible, do not necessarily require the victim to exit...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of industrial economics 1987-09, Vol.36 (1), p.19-34 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This paper studies a variety of strategies by which firms could disadvantage rivals by raising their costs. In this paper, we show that strategies designed to raise rivals' costs have a number of advantages over predatory pricing: They are credible, do not necessarily require the victim to exit, and do not necessarily require the existence of classical market power. The paper sets up a general model, proves a number of general results, and then applies the model to specific strategies involving "overbuying" inputs and vertical integration. |
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ISSN: | 0022-1821 1467-6451 |
DOI: | 10.2307/2098594 |