Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies

We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders' interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms' shares across consumers and provide a character...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic theory 2012-08, Vol.50 (3), p.571-602
Hauptverfasser:	Bejan, Camelia, Bidian, Florin
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Analysis Classical economics Commercial production Competition Competitive equilibrium Competitive firms Consumer behaviour Consumer economics Consumer equilibrium Consumers Economic efficiency Economic equilibrium Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Endowments Equilibrium Equilibrium (Economics) Game Theory Methods Microeconomics Oligopolies Ownership and control Perceptron convergence procedure Production management Profit planning Profits Public Finance Research Article Shareholders Social and Behav. Sciences Stockholders
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders' interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms' shares across consumers and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit.
ISSN:	0938-2259 1432-0479
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-010-0585-3