VOTE-BUYING AND RECIPROCITY

While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of re...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Econometrica 2012-03, Vol.80 (2), p.863-881
Hauptverfasser:	Finan, Frederico, Schechter, Laura
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Algebra Applications Ballots Biology, psychology, social sciences corruption elections Exact sciences and technology experiment Insurance, economics, finance Mathematics Notes and Comments Number theory Paraguay Political behavior Political candidates Political elections Political ideologies Political parties Politicians Preferences Probability and statistics Reciprocity Sciences and techniques of general use social preference Statistics Studies Survey data Trade intermediaries Voter behavior Voter fraud Voter registration Voters Vote‐buying Voting Voting behavior Voting behaviour
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.
ISSN:	0012-9682 1468-0262
DOI:	10.3982/ECTA9035