Does the trust game measure trust?

Could altruism explain observed choices in the standard trust game? With dominant altruism, trustors would give more to poor trustees. However, we find trustors to give no more to poor than to rich trustees, confirming trust as the dominant motivation for “trust like” choices. ► It has been argued t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2012-04, Vol.115 (1), p.20-23
Hauptverfasser: Brülhart, Marius, Usunier, Jean-Claude
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Could altruism explain observed choices in the standard trust game? With dominant altruism, trustors would give more to poor trustees. However, we find trustors to give no more to poor than to rich trustees, confirming trust as the dominant motivation for “trust like” choices. ► It has been argued that altruism may explain “trust-like” choices in laboratory trust games. ► We examine whether, consistent with dominant altruism, trustors give more to poor trustees. ► We reject altruism as the dominant motivation for “trust like” choices.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.039