Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation

Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our common-sense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner (2002, 2004, 2005, 2008; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation." According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's (1985) classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence concerning the confabulation of reason explanations provide further support for this view. In response, I will propose an alternative model of "real mental causation" that can accommodate the empirical evidence just as well as Wegner's. Further, we will see that there is plenty of evidence in support of the assumption that intentions are causally efficacious. This will provide us with ample reason to endorse the model of real mental causation.