Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision Making
Comments on the article by R. Hastie et al (see record 1998-04034-003) and N. Vidmar's (see record 1999-15875-006) critique of the Hastie et al study that examined civil juries' decisions concerning defendants' liability for punitive damages in court cases and whether jurors' dem...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Law and human behavior 1999-12, Vol.23 (6), p.723-730 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Comments on the article by R. Hastie et al (see record 1998-04034-003) and N. Vidmar's (see record 1999-15875-006) critique of the Hastie et al study that examined civil juries' decisions concerning defendants' liability for punitive damages in court cases and whether jurors' demographic characteristics predict their verdicts. The current author argues that their dispute brings into focus some fundamental and unresolved epistemological issues at the foundation of the study of legal decision making. An explanation of why Vidmar's core argument has merit is presented. Hastie et al's attempt to compare mock jury verdicts to an external standard is posited as unconvincing because the comparisons are inherently ambiguous. For the field of legal decision making, it is argued that is cause for regret and concern. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved) |
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ISSN: | 0147-7307 1573-661X |
DOI: | 10.1023/A:1022353825440 |