MONOPSONY AND SALARY SUPPRESSION: THE CASE OF MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER IN THE UNITED STATES

MONOPSONY AND SALARY SUPPRESSION: THE CASE OF MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER IN THE UNITED STATES

Top tier professional soccer in the United States is operated by Major League Soccer (MLS). The MLS was established and operates under a single entity structure, such that all players negotiate and sign contracts with the league rather than with individual teams. This monopsonistic structure was des...

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Veröffentlicht in:The American Economist (New York, N.Y. 1960) N.Y. 1960), 2011-03, Vol.56 (1), p.20-28
Hauptverfasser: Twomey, John, Monks, James
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Analysis
Baseball
Conspiracy
Corporate sponsorship
Economic competition
Economic theory
Internet
Labor market
Labour market
Marginal revenue products
Monopsony
Players associations
Professional soccer
Professional sports
Profitability
Profits
Restraint of trade
Revenue
Revenue sharing
Salary
Soccer
Studies
Success
Teams
Tournaments & championships
Wages
Wages & salaries
Wages and salaries
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Zusammenfassung:Top tier professional soccer in the United States is operated by Major League Soccer (MLS). The MLS was established and operates under a single entity structure, such that all players negotiate and sign contracts with the league rather than with individual teams. This monopsonistic structure was designed to eliminate competition for players across teams within the league and thus allow the league to suppress player salaries. This paper investigates how effective the MLS has been in achieving this goal and finds that the MLS devotes only about 25 percent of its revenues to player salaries, compared to 50 to 60 percent in most other U.S. professional sports and professional soccer leagues abroad.
ISSN:0569-4345
2328-1235
DOI:10.1177/056943451105600104