SALOMON MAIMON'S COMMENTARY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE GIVEN IN IMMANUEL KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

To aim to apply them beyond that scope would imply a return to a precriticai position, from which Kant openly removes himself in CPR.6 In view of this problem, we could consider that Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's classical statement: ^without this presupposition [of the thing in itself] I cannot enter into the system, but with this presupposition I cannot remain within it is totally justified.7 In other words, the pretension that would appear to be the basis of Kantian philosophy is a critical pretension, according to which the only cognoscible thing is that of which we have an immanent knowledge.8 For Kant, this immanent knowledge is always experiential, that is not purely intellectual, in finite beings.9 To state that something in itself is causally determining but !incognoscible, would require a level of acceptance that goes beyond the margins of Kantian criticism. According to habitual readings of his works, Kant on his part holds his position that understanding and sensibility are sources of knowledge that are mutually irreducible.