Admitting guilt by professing innocence: when sentence enhancements based on Alford pleas are unconstitutional

Alford plea is a means of pleading guilty without admitting factual guilt. This note argues that any fact that enhances an Alford defendant's sentence should be either specifically admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Part II provides background information on the mechanics of Alford pleas and plea bargaining generally. Part III examines the nature of this conflict by briefly summarizing the landmark Supreme Court cases of Apprendi and Blakely, as well as the important exception to those cases required by Almendarez-Torres. Part III explores how this problem has divided the lower federal and state courts that have addressed the constitutionality of sentence enhancements for Alford defendants in the wake of Apprendi and Blakely. Part IV argues that because Alford defendants do not admit the underlying facts of their crimes, the only facts that can be conclusively established by their pleas are those that are minimal to sustain a conviction.