THE PARADOX OF RULE OF LAW REFORMS: HOW EARLY REFORMS CAN CREATE OBSTACLES TO FUTURE ONES

In their most recent book, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress, Michael Trebilcock and Ron Daniels show how rule of law reforms have a mixed – not to say disappointing – track record of successes. Their diagnosis is that social–historical–cultural factors and resistance from interest groups are two of the main obstacles to reform. This essay explores these two obstacles in greater depth. With respect to social–historical–cultural factors, my main argument is that early rule of law reforms can create values, practices, and attitudes that may become impediments to future reforms. On the political economy front, these early reforms can strengthen interest groups that will block future reforms. As a consequence, policy makers face a paradox: robust rule of law reforms early on may undermine broader reform efforts by reducing the possibility of other necessary reforms down the road, creating a reform trap. I illustrate the paradox with a Brazilian case study and discuss possible strategies to address this challenge.