PRESERVING A POLITICAL BARGAIN: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NON-INTERVENTIONIST CHALLENGE TO MONOPOLIZATION ENFORCEMENT

The antitrust laws prohibit both collusion among rivals and exclusion of rivals, when such conduct harms competition. From an economic point of view, the competitive danger from each is similar. A collusive agreement among rivals involving price or output, for example, harms competition by reducing industry output and raising prices. Yet a dominant firm can reach the same end by restricting its rivals' access to key inputs or the market, thereby inducing or forcing its rivals to reduce output and raise price. Under such circumstances, the dominant firm can achieve lower industry output and higher industry prices by reducing its own output. Anticompetitive exclusion can thus be understood as creating an "involuntary" or coerced cartel. Notwithstanding the underlying economic similarity between collusion and exclusion, the antitrust norms against cartel behavior (collusion) are broadly accepted, while the norms governing exclusion are disputed.