Rating Causal Relations: Role of Probability in Judgments of Response-Outcome Contingency

We investigated the possible role of the conditional probabilities of an outcome given a response P(O|R) and of an outcome given the absence of a response P(O|NoR) in mediating college students' judgments of response-outcome contingency. A total of 150 subjects in three experiments was asked to...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition memory, and cognition, 1993-01, Vol.19 (1), p.174-188
Hauptverfasser: Wasserman, E. A, Elek, S. M, Chatlosh, D. L, Baker, A. G
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We investigated the possible role of the conditional probabilities of an outcome given a response P(O|R) and of an outcome given the absence of a response P(O|NoR) in mediating college students' judgments of response-outcome contingency. A total of 150 subjects in three experiments was asked to describe the effect that telegraph key tapping had on the brief illumination of a lamp. Subjects' ratings along a prevent-cause scale closely approximated the scheduled contingencies between response (R = key tap) and outcome (O = lamp illumination), as measured by the delta coefficient ΔP = P(O|R) − P(O|NoR) (Experiments 1 and 3). Subjects also sensitively rated the conditional probabilities of an outcome when they tapped the key and when they refrained from doing so (Experiments 2 and 3). Nevertheless, the evidence failed to support the hypothesis that causal ratings were mediated by subjective judgments of P(O|R) and P(O|NoR) because the errors made in judging the conditional probabilities were not consistent with the errors made judging ΔP. We suggest that an associative explanation derived from a model devised by R. A. Rescorla and A. R. Wagner (1972) might account for these and other results.
ISSN:0278-7393
1939-1285
DOI:10.1037/0278-7393.19.1.174