Effects of extremity of offers and concession rate on the outcomes of bargaining

Conducted a study with 278 undergraduates within the context of a mixed-motive relationship in which the only communication permitted was the exchange of allocation demands. No distinctive solution or "fair" outcomes was provided. Ss were confronted by an opponent who either (a) initially demanded the largest possible share of available money and maintained this demand during the entire interaction; (b) initially demanded a minimum-win allocation and maintained this demand; or (c) initially demanded the largest possible share and, if this was not accepted, slowly reduced his demands to a minimum-win level. An additional independent variable was whether the S felt that only he, his opponent, or both parties had complete information. Results show that Ss made more extreme offers when the demands of the opponent were extreme. Ss in the asymmetrical-information conditions emitted more extreme offers during the early stages of bargaining than did Ss in the symmetrical condition. Time pressure resulted in a dramatic shift in Ss' offers to be on the loss side of the bargaining continuum. Making extreme initial demands and reducing them when necessary was more effective in achieving monetary gain than absolute intransigence of either the maximum-win or minimum-win variety; Ss faced with this strategy felt more responsible for and satisfied with their outcomes.