On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality: A Response

Raz comments on Walls, Darwall and Green's criticism on his publications. He also comments on broader problems facing moral and political philosophers, such as the limits of philosophy for solving practical problems, what should people expect from normative principles as opposed to reasons, and the nature of rights and duties. He argues that the reason to respect people that derives from the value of persons, is but one of the reasons to respect people, and that all of them arise out of the value of what is to be respected. That conclusion too had--apart from its theoretical significance in clarifying the ways in which values provide reasons--practical implications. It was meant to suggest a way of avoiding the halo sometimes attached to duties of respect to persons, and open a way of integrating those reasons with other reasons people have, which includes, among other implications, that reasons of respect do not trump all others. This does not mean that there is no duty to respect persons.