Evolutionary stable strategies of a single species model with carry-over effects due to fear: Evolutionary stable strategies of a single species model with carry-over effects due to fear

We propose and analyze a single-species population model subject to fear and its carry-over effect with the help of evolutionary game theory (EGT). We incorporate fear and carry-over cost in the growth of a single species resource population and the extensive analysis of our non-evolutionary model suggests that it can exhibit both weak and strong Allee effects. From the game theoretical viewpoint, we assume that the intrinsic growth rate r of the resource population and the attack rate a of the consumer population are functions of a mean phenotypic trait ( u ) of the resource, following a Normal distribution. Evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are determined by using ESS maximum principle. Our study of ESS suggests that species extinction may be avoided as a result of evolution, though the extinct equilibrium can also be an ESS under certain conditions. The ratio of variation in the intrinsic growth rate and the attack rate plays a significant role in the ESS conditions of different equilibria as well as the global dynamics of our EGT model. Numerical simulations are performed to support our theoretical analysis.