Excess control of family board seats and corporate financing constraints

Excess control of family board seats and corporate financing constraints

We examine the relationship between excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) and financing constraints (FCs) using 2008–2021 data for listed family firms in China. We find that ECFBS intensifies Type II agency problems, thereby worsens corporate FCs. We also investigate the impact of family firm...

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Veröffentlicht in:Managerial and decision economics 2025-01, Vol.46 (1), p.166-182
Hauptverfasser: Yang, Yuqi, Meng, Tianle
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Equity
Financing
Stockholders
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Zusammenfassung:We examine the relationship between excess control of family board seats (ECFBS) and financing constraints (FCs) using 2008–2021 data for listed family firms in China. We find that ECFBS intensifies Type II agency problems, thereby worsens corporate FCs. We also investigate the impact of family firm founder characteristics, family owner characteristics, and external shareholder equity structure on the ECFBS and FCs. Our findings provide evidence of the encroachment effect of family control.
ISSN:0143-6570
1099-1468
DOI:10.1002/mde.4367