3D/4D metaphysical equivalence: lessons from the species debate for the metaphysics of change and persistence

In this paper, we address the question whether the persistence of biological species raises some difficulty for the thesis of the metaphysical equivalence between three-dimensionalism (3D) and four-dimensionalism (4D). We argue that even if one assumes that ‘species’ is a homonymous term that refers to two entities ( evolverons or synchronic species and phylons or diachronic ones), 3D/4D metaphysical equivalence still holds. In doing so, we challenge Reydon’s strong association between a synchronic view of species and a 3D theory of persistence, and between the diachronic view of species and a 4D theory of persistence (2008). Finally, we show how this debate on persistence of species helps to illustrate some misunderstandings behind contemporary analytic metaphysics of change and persistence.