DEMURRAGE, DETENTION, AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS: A PROPOSED CONTRACTING SOLUTION
Disputes are swirling amongst carriers, marine terminals, shippers, and policy-makers about demurrage and detention charges, with the shippers claiming that the carriers and marine terminals are using demurrage and detention more as a revenue generator than as a fee for holding onto assets (i.e., co...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of transportation law, logistics, and policy logistics, and policy, 2018-01, Vol.85 (2), p.168-187 |
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| creator | Stapleton, Drew Nandialath, Anup Menon Bosé, Sanjoy |
| description | Disputes are swirling amongst carriers, marine terminals, shippers, and policy-makers about demurrage and detention charges, with the shippers claiming that the carriers and marine terminals are using demurrage and detention more as a revenue generator than as a fee for holding onto assets (i.e., containers). The Federal Maritime Commission has signaled that it prefers a market solution rather than a governmental dictate. One of its six suggestions is an optional billing model wherein terminal operators bill shippers directly for demurrage and ocean carriers bill shippers for detention; or similar models to resolve disputes, provide clarity, and transparency. We propose a contracting model grounded in Agency Theory as part of a potential marketbased resolution. |
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The Federal Maritime Commission has signaled that it prefers a market solution rather than a governmental dictate. One of its six suggestions is an optional billing model wherein terminal operators bill shippers directly for demurrage and ocean carriers bill shippers for detention; or similar models to resolve disputes, provide clarity, and transparency. 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| identifier | ISSN: 1078-5906 |
| ispartof | Journal of transportation law, logistics, and policy, 2018-01, Vol.85 (2), p.168-187 |
| issn | 1078-5906 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_3085715789 |
| source | Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Competitive advantage Disputes Fees & charges Fines & penalties Inventory Lockouts Ports Shipping industry Tariffs US exports |
| title | DEMURRAGE, DETENTION, AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS: A PROPOSED CONTRACTING SOLUTION |
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