ARISTOTLE ON RECIPROCITY, EQUIVALENT VALUE, AND THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF MARKETS

Political philosophers and economists frequently point to reciprocity, or treating others as they treat you, as a key component of social interaction.1 As a norm guiding personal relationships, reciprocity rests on an idea of symmetry, a give and take in which each party voluntarily responds to similar treatment by the other. As a norm guiding relations of social cooperation, reciprocity reflects the idea that each member should contribute, to the best of her ability, to the cooperative enterprise from which she benefits.2 In both aspects, reciprocity is thought to rest not on explicit contractual obligations but rather on an underlying sense of balance or fairness, which motivates individuals to act without expecting a specific return. Empirical research has attested to this human tendency to respond in kind, and studies have concluded that reciprocity plays a significant role in a wide range of economic phenomena, including bargaining, employeremployee relations, and the provision of public goods. At the same time, many contemporary accounts present a categorical distinction between reciprocity and the instrumental behavior thought to characterize rational actors in the modern market.4 Reciprocity sets out to return a benefit already received (“balanced reciprocity”) or rests on the assumption that others will typically respond in kind (“generalized reciprocity”).5 While not irrational, reciprocity can be personally costly, at least in the short term. By contrast, the wealth-maximizing economic actor is motivated by considerations of personal benefit more narrowly understood. If we regard the market as an institution designed to facilitate such conduct—if it is, in Serge-Christophe Kolm’s words, “a set of purely self-interested agreements”—then the logic of the market will be distinct from, and perhaps in tension with, the logic of reciprocity.6 A central aim of this Article is to unsettle the assumption that reciprocity and economic exchange are categorically distinct types of human interaction. This distinction, as typically articulated, paints an overly narrow picture of marketplace transactions as motivated exclusively by wealth maximization, without regard for the ways economic activity can reflect and serve other ends. It also oversimplifies the complex relationship between reciprocity and self-interest broadly understood. To establish these points, I turn to a somewhat unlikely source: the ethical and political philosophy of Aristotle. A close rea