Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of wei...

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Veröffentlicht in:Annals of operations research 2024-05, Vol.336 (3), p.1373-1393
Hauptverfasser: Armijos-Toro, Livino M., Alonso-Meijide, José M., Mosquera, Manuel A.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Business and Management
Combinatorics
Games
Operations research
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Research
Public good
Theory of Computation
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Zusammenfassung:In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.
ISSN:0254-5330
1572-9338
DOI:10.1007/s10479-023-05340-3