Systematic fraud: Tempo coverage of Indonesia's presidential election 2024

Even before the presidential election, held on February 14, 2024, Indonesia was already scrutinized for the declining trajectory of its democratization process (Aspinall et al., 2020; Ulum, 2020; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). The Economist Intelligence Unit gives an overall score of 6.3, placing it in 56th place, two places lower than its previous position (EIU Report, 2024). Freedom House places the country under the “partly free” category, scoring 58 out of 100 (Freedom House, 2024). Prodemocracy groups predicted possibility of electoral fraud. The most noteworthy was the release of the documentary “Dirty Vote” on YouTube 3 days before the election (PSHK Indonesia, 2024), which presented three legal scholars/activists exposing signals of electoral fraud committed by the three presidential candidates (Anies Baswedan, Prabowo Subianto, and Ganjar Pranowo) and their teams. However, they mainly directed their criticism at Prabowo Subianto. Thus, when he won the election with 58.58% of the votes, countless voices of disappointment emerged. Activists and academia declared their concerns for the future of Indonesia's democracy. Why and how politicians violated laws and norms to falsify electoral outcomes constitute indeed a set of topics of importance. Understanding it is not only essential to the history of many democratic systems but also to shed light on political behaviors and their sociological aspects (Molina & Lehoucq, 1999). Unsurprisingly, previous research efforts have identified many structural factors associated with reductions in the integrity of the electoral process. Defined as clandestine efforts to shape election results (Lehoucq, 2003), electoral fraud may include the extent of who is allowed to vote, who is allowed to run, who is allowed to win, and the presence or absence of repression during the process (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). Elections present a space for contestation through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and even defeat incumbents (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Elite coalitions and the opposition may want to reduce their risk of violent removal from office (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). When incumbents perceive that the upcoming election will be tight and the electoral rules are majoritarian, the political risks of the ruling party becoming an absolute loser increase. Under such high uncertainty, limiting political competition is of interest, and electoral misconducts may be part of the incumbents' strategy to survi